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BRINGING DOWN THE BARRIERS: *
AMERICAN LAWS THAT IMPEDE TRADE WITH THE CIS,
by
ARTHUR M. DULA

**

LYNNE M. TRACY
RENEE A. RuBINO

INTRODUCTION

For most of this century, the U.S. Government imposed severe restrictions
upon trade with the former Soviet Union. 2 Traditionally, these trade restrictions
have been a tool of American foreign policy. 3 Some of the rationales for placing
restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union included: the desire to encourage
internal political reform; 4 the need to protect national security; 5 and the desire to
6
encourage liberalization of Soviet immigration policies.
However, changes have occurred in the past five years that demand a
serious re-evaluation of American trade policy with the former Soviet Union.
First and foremost of these changes is the demise of the state known as the Soviet

* This article was written as part of the work of the David L. Brennan Endowed Chair of Law at the University

of Akron School of Law during the fall semester of 1992. The authors wish to thank David and Ann Brennan
for their generous support of this research.
I The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991. CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States,
a loose organization of former Soviet republics, although not all former republics of the Soviet Union have
joined the CIS. Most notable among those countries deciding not to join are the Baltic countries, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. The terms Russia and CIS may be used interchangeably in this paper.
** B.S. Chemistry/Mathematics 1970, Eastern New Mexico University; iD. 1975, Tulane University;
Patent
Attorney for Butler, Binion, Rice, Cook, Knapp, 1974-1980; Private Practice of Aerospace & Technological
Law in Houston, 1980-1991; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Houston, South Texas College of Law,
1980-1991; Consultant to NASA on draft Space Shuttle contract, 1980-1987; Consultant to Office of
Technology Policy U.S. Congress for legal regime on the U.S. Space Station "Freedom", 1987; Consultant to
Center for Space Policy of Japan, 1989; David L. Brennan Chair, The University of Akron School of Law,
1992-1993; Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law, 1993-1994.
Research Assistant for David L. Brennan Chair, 1992-1993; J.D. candidate May 1994.
**** Research Assistant for David L. Brennan Chair, 1992-1993; J.D. candidate May 1994.
2 See STAFF OFSENAT CoMNt. ON FOREIGN FELATIONS, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., WORKSHOP ON U.S.-U.S.S.R.
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, at 213-19 (Comm. Print 1990) (a chronology of U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet
Union since World War I); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., U.S.-SovIET
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: THE INTERPAY OF ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND DIPLOMACY, at 48-65
(Comm. Print 1973).

3 Kevin F.F. Quigley & William J. Long, Export Controls:Moving Beyond Economic Containment WORLD
POL'Y J. 165, 166 (Winter 1990).
4 See generally H.R. REP. No. 569, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1992) (a dissenting view to the Freedom
Support Act of 1992).
5 Quigley & Long, supra note 3, at 166.
6 S. RE,. No. 87, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 2-4 (1990) (Bentsen delegation report on trip to the Soviet Union).
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Union. Taking its place are fifteen independent states essentially drawn along the
lines of the old Soviet ethnic republics. Russia and Ukraine remain the largest in
terms of size and importance, but the breakup of the central Soviet authority
should highlight the fact that each of these new states has its own history, culture
and traditions. The old Cold War, US-USSR framework for making policy
evaluations and decisions is no longer adequate for the present situation.
Second, the deterioration of the domestic situation has created political,
economic and social turmoil in Russia and in the other states. The United States
has national security and economic interests in promoting stability in this region.
The sale of military hardware from the Red Army's arsenal to Third World
countries and private individuals is a symptom not merely of poor security, but of
desperate economic times. 7 The severe economic conditions may create further
waves of refugees seeking assistance from the United States. Ethnic strife and the
re-emergence of Russian chauvinism threaten not only future trade opportunities,
but also existing American interests in Russia. A policy of easing trade
restrictions and encouraging a stronger American presence in Russia could
increase stability and improve relations between the United States and Russia.
Finally, trade restrictions as a weapon in foreign policy have had a
detrimental effect on the American-Russian trade relationship. Low volume of
trade, lost jobs and profits, and loss of competitive edge to West European and
Japanese companies have left American businesses at a great disadvantage in the
Russian market. 8 A window of opportunity exists to take advantage of the
openings created by the fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.9 As
West European and Japanese competitors, who face fewer restrictions than their
American counterparts,10 move to fill these openings, American companies will
find themselves left with only the crumbs of the Russian trade pie.
In light of these changes and opportunities, it is necessary first to establish
whether current trade restrictions apply to all former constituent parts of the
Soviet Union or only to Russia. Second, the American-Russian trade relationship
resembles a minefield. Some of the most powerful trade restrictions remain
firmly in place. Others have been defused. This article will attempt to provide
some guidance through the minefield. Finally, attention will be given to pending

7 Fred Hatt, Russia Plans Leaner,More Open Military, WASH. POST. May 23, 1992, at A13; A. Craig Copetas,
Macabre:GanglandGhoulishnessShows Up at Decrepit Morgue, NEWSDAY, Aug. 17, 1992, at 8, (Russian mob
involvement in arms sales).
8 Quigley & Long, supra note 3, at 175-78.
9 While it is true that the Communist Party remains as an important force at the local level of Russian political
life, the ruling of the Constitutional Court, limiting the Communist Party's ability to organize above the local
level, undermines the Party's ability to act as a national force in politics. See generally Lynne M. Tracy,
Comment, Prospectsfor an Independent Judiciary:The Russian ConstitutionalCourt and the CPSU Trial, 26
AKRON L. REv. 581 (1993).
10 Quigley & Long, supranote 3, at 175-78.
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legislation that affects trade with Russia. Hopefully, this analysis will provide
some insight into: (1) the past U.S. trade with the former Soviet Union; (2) where
the relationship is now; and (3) what direction it should go in light of the demise
of the USSR and the rise of the CIS and other independent states.'
SUCCESSOR STATE AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS: JUST RUSSIA?

Under U.S. law, when one part of a state becomes a new state, it does not
succeed to the international agreements made by the predecessor state unless it
accepts such agreements and the other parties agree.' 2 The U.S. laws which
regulate trade are not, however, "international agreements" as defined by the
Restatement.1 3 The application of U.S. domestic law to a new state is very
different from requiring compliance by the successor state to agreements made
by its predecessor.
Four newly independent Russian republics challenged the authority of the
U.S. Commerce Department to continue an anti-dumping duty investigation. The
Department initiated the investigation against the former Soviet Union, pursuant
to 19 U.S.C. 1673b (d)(1). The U.S. Court of International Trade upheld the
14
Commerce Department's authority to continue the investigation.
The merchandise did not evaporate upon dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Commerce's view is that to terminate the investigation would
cause a gap in statutory coverage which Congress did not intend, and
the allegedly offending merchandise would escape scrutiny.
Dissolution of a country, as opposed to mere change in government, is
a rare enough event so that Commerce might have construed the
statute to permit a gap in this instance, but its construction of the
statute is not unreasonable and may indeed be the better
construction. 5
Reasonable interpretation of a statute by the agency which administers it
must be upheld. 16 In light of this recent opinion, U.S. trade restrictions would
most likely be found to apply to each of the former Soviet republics.

" See also COMM. ON SovIEr AFFAus, Normalization of the US.-Soviet Trade Relationship, 46 REc. AssN B.
Crry N.Y. 104-28 (March 1991); Jonathan H. Hines, Reforms in Eastern Europe Spur Dismantling of United
States Trade Barriers, N.Y.J. 1 (Mar. 7, 1990) (other surveys of American laws impeding trade with the
Soviet
Union).
12
RESTATEMENT FOREGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE U.S. § 210 (1986).
13 See id § 301.
14 Techsnabexport, Ltd. et al. v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 469 (CL Intl Trade Sep. 25, 1992).
15 I at 472.
16 Id at 473 (citingChevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
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LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS To US-RUSSIA TRADE

Technology Restrictions
American trade restrictions on the transfer of technology are the most
severe legal impediments to the development of a stronger, more stable trading
partnership with Russia. 17 Most of the technology restrictions imposed during the
years of the Cold War remain firmly in place. Despite the many changes in
Russia, American policy on the issue of technology transfer shows little sign of
changing.
8
1. The Arms Export Control Act'

The Arms Export Control Act regulates the sale, transfer and leasing of all
military arms for export by public or private sources.1 9 The purpose of the Act is
to prohibit the sale of arms in situations that are inconsistent with U.S. foreign
policy interests. 20
Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State (taking into
account other United States activities abroad, such as military assistance,
economic assistance, and the food for peace program) shall be responsible for the
continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing,
cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter, including, but not limited to,
determining(1) whether there will be a sale to or financing for a country and
the amount thereof;
(2) whether there will be a lease to a country;
(3) whether there will be a cooperative project and the scope
thereof; and
(4) whether there will be delivery or other performance under
such sale, lease, cooperative project, or export, to the end that sales,
financing, leases, cooperative projects, and exports will be integrated
17 These restrictions are the most severe in two respects: (1) 'Technology" encompasses a vast area of goods
including, for example, areas involving industry, the military, the medical field, scientific research and
agriculture; and, (2) changes have occurred in other areas such as immigration (Jackson-Vanik Amendment
repealed) and financial restrictions (Byrd Amendment and Stevenson Amendment repealed) while restrictions
on "technology" remain largely unchanged.
18 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988).
19 David J. Scheffer, Current Development: U.S. Law and the Iran-ContraAffair, 81 AM. J. INrL L. 699
(1987).
20 22 U.S.C. § 2752(b) (1988).
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with other United States activities and to the end that the foreign
21
policy of the United States would be best served thereby.
Essentially, two rationales have sustained the AECA since its inception in
1968: the Cold War and the desire to maintain a technological edge over the
Soviet Union.
Several reasons indicate a need to revise the AECA. First, the Act creates a
list of restricted items that is too broad and far-reaching. Second, the language of
the Act itself is too vague. The law does not make a clear distinction between a
prohibition on the sale of actual weapons and the sale of technology that may
have military application. 22 This type of technology, known as dual use
technology, 23 can be caught up in the net of AECA restrictions merely on the
theoretical possibility that it could serve some military purpose. 24 Third, the end
of the Cold War has arrived. The former Soviet Union no longer presents the
military threat that drove American leaders to protect every technological edge.
Two steps by American lawmakers could improve the competitiveness of
American companies who are hampered by the AECA. First, Congress should
reduce the overall list of restricted items. Second, the language of the AECA
should be narrowed to eliminate catch-all phrases that indiscriminately prohibit
25
trade in dual use technology.
26
2. The Export Administration Act

The Export Administration Act essentially enhances the Arms Export
Control Act. The EAA governs the export of goods and technology without
regard to potential significant military contribution.
(11) The acquisition of national security sensitive goods and
technology by the Soviet Union and other countries the actions or
policies of which run counter to the national security interests of the

21 id.

22 Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls, Committee on
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy. Executive Summary: Finding Common Ground (National Academy
Press 1991).

23 For a recent example of trade sanctions imposed pursuant to the AECA and EAA, see Public Notice 1626,
DETERMINATION REGARDING MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION AcTIrrs OF FOREIGN PERSONS, OFFICE OF
THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SEcuRIY AFFAIRS (May 18, 1992). (Sanctions imposed on certain

categories of technology against Russia and India. Two year ban on licenses for exports, USG contracts, and
importation of products produced by Russia or India).
24 For a more detailed study on dual use technology, see generally Amy L. Rothstein The Shifting Focus of
Dual Use Export Controls: An Overview of Recent Developments and a Forecastfor the Future,25 INT'L LAW.
267 (1991). Examples the author cites include computers, telecommunications, and machine tools. Id at 271.
25 Id
26 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1988).
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United States, has led to the significant enhancement of Soviet bloc
military-industrial capabilities. This enhancement poses a threat to the
security of the United States, its allies, and other friendly nations, and
places additional demands on the defense budget of the United
27
States.
The EAA even reaches beyond U.S. territory to foreign subsidiaries of
American companies and prevents them from re-exporting goods that originated
28
in the United States.
The policy reasons that sustain the Export Administration Act are nearly the
same as those given in support of the Arms Export Control Act: protection of
national security and maintenance of a technological edge over the Soviet Union.
The EAA impairs the competitiveness of American businesses in several
ways. The U.S. government maintains a much longer list of controlled items than
other countries that restrict trade with Russia.29 Also, the complex regulations of
the EAA may simply discourage an American business at the outset from
entering markets with controlled technology.3 0 The resources that a company
must devote to the licensing procedure3' increase the cost of the American
product.32 A lost contract means lost sales and lost jobs. 33 The direct cost of
licensing procedures to the U.S. economy is $7 to $10 billion per year.34
In comparison, West European and Japanese competitors have an edge in
the Russian market. Their governments usually have shorter lists of restricted
items and more streamlined procedures for obtaining licenses.35 The Japanese, for
example, employ twenty-five people in a central operation to administer
licensing procedures. 36 The American government employs three hundred people
27 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (11) (1988).

28 Developments in the Law - International EnvironmentalLaw, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1609, 1622 (1991).
29 Quigley & Long, supra note 3, at 87.
30id.
31 In an effort to comply with the Export Administration Act, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), a large
computer company, employs 120 export-control specialists. Since one computer system may contain hundreds
of hardware-software combinations, DEC codes each of the thousands of options and compiles a licensing
profile for each system whenever an order is booked. DEC handles from 200,000 to 300,000 saleable options
which must be classified by country eligibility and level of technology. 18 ELECTRONIC Bus. 22 (March 16,
1992) available in LEXIS, NExis Library, ELcBUs File.
32 Quigley & Long, supra note 3, at 176.
33 Id at 176-77. In 1983, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on the Soviet gas pipeline project. Caterpillar
had 80 percent of the Soviet market for heavy duty earth-moving equipment. Komatsu, a Japanese company,
had only 20 percent. Due to the sanctions, Komatsu gained Caterpillar's 80 percent marketshare, and Caterpillar
lost about 15,000 jobs. Perestroika and Its Implicationsfor the United States: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1989) (statement of Thomas H. Naylor, Professor of
Economics, Duke University).
34 Quigley & Long, supra note 3, at 178.
35 Id. at 176.
36 id.
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spread out over the Commerce and Defense Departments to administer licensing
regulations. 37 The prolonged licensing period in the United States also gives
foreign competitors the opportunity to obtain information on pending U.S. export
38
licenses and apply for a similar license in their own country with fewer barriers.
EAA licensing regulations also hamper West-West trade and create
problems for U.S. foreign subsidiaries when they wish to re-export restricted
materials. 39 Many of the COCOM countries already evade the problems caused
by stringent U.S. export restrictions.4 0 These countries simply no longer
participate in joint review sessions. 41 The ability of foreign competitors to evade
review merely highlights the need for more realistic licensing procedures.
Several changes are in order if American companies are to operate on a
more level playing field with foreign competitors in the bid for Russian business.
First, the scope of the EAA should be narrowed by employing exclusive
language rather than inclusive language on the list of controlled items. Second,
simplify licensing procedures to speed up approval time. Third, coordinate all
licensing through one central organization.
2
3. Commercial Space Launch Act'

The CSLA regulates launches within and outside the U.S. 43 In order to
launch a launch vehicle or operate a launch site, a party must first obtain a license
from the Department of Transportation. 44 If the launch or launch site is within
United States territory, the regulations extend to all persons, United States citizen
or non-citizen. 45 If the launch or launch site is outside United States territory, the
regulation only covers United States citizens. 46
(1) All requirements of Federal law which apply to the launch of a
launch vehicle or the operation of a launch site shall be requirements
for a license under this chapter for the launch vehicle or the operation
of a launch site, respectively....

37 id.
38 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:
THE INTERPLAY OF FBONOMNCS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. AND DILoMAcY 51 (Comm. Print 1973).

39 Quigley & Long, supra note 3, at 167.
40 1& at 169.
41 id.

42 49 U.S.C. A. § 2601 (West Supp. 1992).
43 id.

44 49 U.S.C.A. § 2607 (aXI) (West Supp. 1992).
45 49 U.S.C.A. § 2605 (aXi) (West Supp. 1992).
46 49 U.S.C.A. § 2605 (aX2) (West Supp. 1992).
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The Secretary may, with respect to launches and the operation of
launch sites, prescribe such additional requirements as are necessary to
protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national
47
security interests and foreign policy interests of the United States.
Under the license review process, various U.S. government agencies may
consider and oppose the grant of a license. The process covers a broad scope
which includes consideration of the launch's impact on national security and
foreign policy.
The Act also gives the Secretary of Transportation the authority to issue,
modify, suspend and revoke licenses. 48 The Secretary may also prescribe
49
additional requirements.
The tension that resulted from the Cold War was the policy consideration
for such sweeping regulatory authority in the name of foreign policy interests.
Today, it is in the U.S. interest to streamline and clarify the regulations with
respect to trade. The vague and time-consuming requirements of the CSLA make
it difficult for U.S. corporations to make accurate business determinations, thus
deterring or protracting certain business ventures. Broad phrases such as
protection of "national security interests" or "foreign policy interests" leave the
door to potential restrictions wide open. Furthermore, it may take up to six
months for the Secretary of Transportation to make a determination on a license
application.50 A more reasonable policy would include not only clearer, but more
expeditious licensing requirements in order to enhance trade opportunities.
4. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 195851
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was amended in 1988.52
Under section 311 of the enactment, contracts for expendable launch vehicle
services may be limited to sources within the United States when the
53
Administrator determines that such limitation is in the public interest.

47 49 U.S.C.A. § 2607 (aXI), (b) (West Supp. 1992).
48 Stephanie Lee-Miller, Symposium on the Law and Outer Space: Licensing and Regulating U.S. Commercial
Space Launches, 4 J.L. & Ttu. 45, 117 (1989).
49id

50 Arthur M. Dula, PrivateSector Activities in Outer Space, 19 INr LAw. 159 (1985).
51 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1988).
52 Pub. L. No. 100-147, § 311 (a), 101 Stat. 867 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2459 (c)).
53 id
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The policy behind such a restriction is to protect the economic interests of
American businesses. 54 On September 1, 1988, pursuant to section 311, the
NASA Administrator limited contracts for expendable launch vehicle services to
55
sources within the United States.
The public interest of such a restriction should be reassessed in light of the
recent changes in the former Soviet Union. The emerging free markets of the
former Soviet republics offer a variety of opportunities for U.S. businesses.
Protecting American interests would be counter-productive at a time when freer
trade is to the benefit of both nations.
56
5. International Economic Emergency Powers Act

The IEEPA was meant to enable the President to act quickly in an
emergency to protect the United States, by economic means from "any unusual or
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
or economy."57 Under Sec.
U.S., to the [U.S.] national security, foreign 5policy,
8
701, the President may declare an emergency.
Sec. 1702(a)(1) describes the economic steps that the President may take
59
during an emergency.
President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by
means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise--(A) investigate, regulate,
or prohibit--[currency or credit transactions]; and (B) investigate,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving any property in which any foreign country or
national thereof has any interest; by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 6°
...the

President Reagan invoked the IEEPA twice between 1983-1985 to prevent
EAA regulations from lapsing when Congress was deadlocked. 61 This particular
54 [NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.] Determination and Findings. Authority to
Exclude Foreign Sources From Mixed Fleet Program, Phase III Expendable Launch Vehicle Services (signed
b, James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA).
5T See id

56 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-02 (1988).
57 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988).

58 id
59 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (aXl) (1988).
60 Id
61 Quigley & Long, supra note 3, at 183.
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use of the IEEPA essentially circumvented one of the restraining features of the
62
EAA: an extensive set of determinations before the imposition of controls.
The original purpose of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act
was to limit the economic powers granted to the President during peacetime
emergencies. 63 Congress did not intend for the IEEPA to be the vehicle for
keeping routine export regulations in place. 64 Without proper vigilance, the
IEEPA could become a convenient tool of the executive branch to serve foreign
policy goals in situations that are not true emergencies. 65 The possible future
misuse of this law to extend trade barriers could create an instability in our trade
relationship with Russia. A higher threshold for the declaration of an emergency
would help prevent such misuse.
Tariff Restrictions
American tariff restrictions on trade with Russia represent a mixed policy
picture. Some very important restrictions remain in place. Others have been
eased in the wake of the momentous changes that have occurred in the former
Soviet Union.
1. The Trade Act of 1974--Beneficiary Developing Country 66
Under Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, the Generalized System of
Preferences offers duty-free treatment of certain products to countries designated
67
as beneficiary developing countries by the President.
Congress offered a number of reasons for creating this designation. First,
the grant of duty-free status was to help developing countries compete effectively
with industrialized nations. 68 Second, Congress deemed trade rather than aid to
be in the best long-term interests of both trading partners. 69 Third, stronger
trading relationships with developing countries could provide new markets for
U.S. exports. 70 Fourth, increased trade in a developing country would help
generate foreign exchange earnings to meet debt obligations. 7' Fifth, duty-free
72
status might promote additional trade opportunities for the developing country.
62d
63 Id.

64 Id.
65 id
66 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-63 (1988).
67 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988).
68
1d.
691id
70 Id.

71 id.
72 id.
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Sixth, Congress intended the designation to assist a developing country integrate
itself into the international trading system. 73 Finally, the grant of duty-free
74
treatment was to encourage developing countries to eliminate trade barriers.
However, See. 2462(b) of the 1974 Trade Act lists those countries that are
ineligible to receive beneficiary developing country status. 75 The Soviet Union
remains on that list.
The goals of the beneficiary developing country designation seem perfectly
suited for the type of trade relationship American policy should be fostering with
Russia. Despite the superpower status of the former Soviet Union, the years of
glasnost revealed the difficult economic conditions and a declining standard of
living. Furthermore, the political reasons for placing the former Soviet Union on
that list have largely disintegrated. The Yeltsin Government has demonstrated
unprecedented cooperation with the United States. Continued cooperation with a
friendly government in Russia is in American foreign policy interests. Granting
Russia beneficiary developing country status could boost American-Russian
trade volume. Such a boost would benefit both economies and could help
stabilize the Russian domestic situation.
Obtaining BDC status is a two-step process. First, the USSR must be
removed from the ineligible list. This step could be achieved by Senate Bill 2798
the
which amends the Trade Act of 1974 by removing the Soviet Union from
77
Russia.
to
status
BDC
extend
must
President
the
Second,
list.76
ineligible
2. Accession of State Trading Regimes to the General Agreement on Tariffs
78
and Trade
GATT is an international mechanism for reducing political and economic
79
tensions by increasing trade and economic cooperation on a multilateral basis.
Eighty-five percent of international trade is conducted under the GATT
80
umbrella.

73

Id.

741

75 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b) (1988).
76 S. 2798, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). § 131 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 removed Czechoslovkia
from the ineligible lisL Act of August 20, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 629.
77 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988).
78 19 U.S.C. § 2905 (1988).
79 William L. Richter, Note, Soviet "Participation"in GATT: A Case for Accession, 20 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. &
POL477, 522 (1988).
801dU at 477.
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In 1986, the Soviet Union requested observer status in the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations.8 1 This request was rejected on the grounds that
the Soviet economy was incompatible with GATT's basic philosophy and
82
practices.
Sec. 2905 grants the President the authority to withhold GATT membership
from a state with a non-market economy or a state that restricts trade with the
U.S.8 3
Before any major foreign country accedes [to the GATT], the President
shall determine:
(1) whether state trading enterprises account for a significant share of (A) the exports of such major foreign country, or
(B) the goods of such major foreign country that are subject to
competition from goods imported into such foreign country; and
(2) whether such state trading enterprises (A) unduly burden and restrict, or adversely affect, the foreign trade of the
United States or the [U.S.] economy, or
4
(B) are likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect.8
If the President makes both of these determinations in the affirmative, then
he may withhold the application of the GATT until the U.S. reaches an
agreement with the foreign country on the role and activities of the state trading
enterprises that suggests more of a market economy approach.8 5
Under Communist rule, the former Soviet Union was a non-market
economy. This particular circumstance has supported the incompatibility
rationale for denying Soviet participation in GATT. 86 Other reasons for denial
include the non-convertibility of the ruble8 7 and the irrational price structure
created by a centrally planned and subsidized economy.8 8 However, the Yeltsin
administration is in the process of transforming Russia into a market economy by
tackling all of these problems.89

81 1,.

82 & at 479.
83 19 U.S.C. § 2905 (a) (1988).
84 19 U.S.C. § 2905 (b) (1988).
85 Id.
86

Richter, supra note 79, at 479.

87Id. at 511.

881I
89 Aid to Russia, EcoNoMisT. June 20, 1992, at 24.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss3/4

12

Dula et al.: Bringing Down the Barriers

Winter/Spring 1993]

BRINGING DowN THE BARRIERS

Russian membership in GATT could yield benefits for both Russia and the
West.90 First, membership might help integrate Russia into the international
financial system. 91 Second, from a political standpoint, it makes little sense to
deny Russia admission when much of Eastern Europe and Cuba already hold
membership. 92 Third, membership might also assist in the development of
Russia's trade potential. 93 Hard currency profits are vital to Russia's rebuilding
efforts. Fourth, it would be possible to apply GATT normatively to Russia if its
trade practices were considered unfair. 94 Finally, admission to GATT could
promote positive political change and stability in Russia during this transitional
period. To achieve these goals, Russia should be granted permanent membership
in GATI. 95
96
3. The Trade Act of 1974 - The Jackson-Vanik Amendment

The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 revoked most-favored nation
tariff treatment 97 to all Communist countries. 98 There were two rationales for the
original revocation of MFN status for Communist countries. 99 First, American
involvement in the Korean War left many with the feeling that it was not proper
to offer trade concessions to countries which were aiding the North Koreans. 10°
Second, the revocation provided protection to domestic producers. 0 1
As a part of the 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement, the Nixon administration
was preparing to seek a waiver of the revocation in order to grant the Soviet
Union MFN status.1°- However, when the Trade Act of 1974 passed, it contained
an amendment sponsored by Senator Henry Jackson and Representative Charles

90

Richter, supra note 79, at 480.

91 ld. at 499.

92 id.at 499--500.
93 1d. at 500-04.

94Id.
at 505.
95
Arthur Dunkel, GATT Director General, recently announced that "it will take an unspecified length of time
before [Russia] becomes a full GATT member." Dunkel Says Russia Cooperates With GATT But He Sets No
Date For Full Membership, BNA INrL TRADE DAILY, Feb. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, International Trade
Library, BNA File.
96 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1988).
97

"[MFN] obligate[s] ...contracting parties [to GAT] to extend all concessions or favors made by each in the

past, or which might be made in the future to... any other state
in such away that their mutual trade will never
be on a less favorable basis than is enjoyed by that state whose commercial relations with each is on the most
favorable basis." R. SNYDER, THE MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE 10 (1948). See generally Paul Lansing & Eric
C. Rose, The Grantingand Suspension of Most-Favored-NationStatusfor Nonmarket Economy States: Policy
and Consequences, 25 HARv. INTL L. J.329 (1984).
98 19 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988), repealed by Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 102-266, § 257 (C) (1) 76 Stat. 882.
99 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM.ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., U.S.-SoIET CMMERCIAL RELATIONS: 'iE
INTERPLAY OF ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND DimoMAcy 52 (Comm. Print 1973).

100Jd.
101 [d.
10 2

Trade, U.S. Policy Since 1945, CONG. Q., 109-110(1984).
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Vanik. t0 3 This amendment conditioned any waiver of the prohibition on
liberalization of Soviet immigration policies. 0 4
To assure the continued dedication of the United States to
fundamental human rights.., products from any nonmarket economy
country shall not be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment
(most-favored nation treatment), such country shall not participate in
any program of the Government of the United States which extends
credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees, directly or
indirectly, and the President of the United States shall not conclude
any commercial agreement with any such country. . . [while] the
President determines that such country (1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration ....

"105

Mikhail Gorbachev began liberalizing Soviet travel and immigration
policies in the late 1980s in pursuit of MFN status for the Soviet Union. In
December 1990, the Soviet Union received a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. 1 6
However, while the relaxation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is
helpful, 0 7 Russia should be granted permanent MFN status rather than the yearly
waiver. Many of the political goals and policies that drove the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment are simply out of date. Jackson-Vanik should be completely
repealed.
4. The Tariff Act of 1930108
The Tariff Act of 1930 bans the importation of products made from forced
labor.

103 Ford Signs The Trade Act: Soviet Issue is Unresolved. N.Y. TMEs. Jan. 4, 1975 at Al. See also PAULA
STERN. WATERs EDGE (1979) (for a full account of the origins of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment).
'04 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (a) (1988).
10 5 Id.
'06 Exec. Order No. 12, 740 56 Fed. Reg. 355 (1990). According to Robert D. Hormats, vice chairman of
Goldman Sachs International, "It sweeps away all the Code War baggage." Stuart Auerbach, From Russian With
Lower Tariffs, WASH. POST. June 19, 1992, at A33. But see supra text accompanying notes 19-86 and infra text
accompanying notes 111, 130.
107 Perestroika and Its Implications for the United States: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small
Business, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1989) (statement of Eugene J. Milosh, President of the American
Association of Exporters and Importers). But see Hines, supra note 11, at 1 (MFN will have little immediate
impact on U.S.-Russian trade because the bulk of Russian exports, "raw materials and lightly processed goods are of the type carrying little or no tariff even absent MFN").
108 12 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988).
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All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or
manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor
or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions shall
not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and the
importation thereof is hereby prohibited. .... 109
In 1988, Congress found that Soviet forced labor was being used to produce
export goods.110 However, the massive political changes in the former Soviet
Union, and the Western desire to improve commercial relations with Russia and
the other CIS countries combine to make it unlikely that the U.S. will press this
particular issue with the leadership of these countries.' 1 '
FinancialRestrictions
The greatest changes in American law and policy on trade with Russia have
occurred in the area of financial restrictions. Congress has recently repealed
several major legal/financial impediments, and several others are under
consideration for repeal. Very few obstacles to improved American-Russian trade
remain in this particular area.
1. The Byrd Amendment' 1 2
The Byrd Amendment barred new loans or guarantees by the Export-Import
Bank." 3 The amendment also specifically prohibited loans for the production of
fossil fuel energy resources. 1 4 Congress repealed the Byrd Amendment in
October 1991.t I 5
2. The Stevenson Amendment'

16

The Stevenson Amendment prohibited all U.S. agencies, other than the
Commodity Credit Corporation, from guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credits
to the Soviet Union in connection with exports in excess of $300 million without
prior Congressional approval." 7 Congress repealed the Stevenson Amendment
in October 1991.118
iogId.
110

Act Aug. 23, 19988, P. L. 100-418, Title I, Subtitle H, Pan 1, § 1906, 102 Stat. 1313 (1988).

111 The political crackdown in China in 1989 seems to have led to renewed interest in this issue where China is
concerned. There have been charges that China is exporting goods made from forced labor. See Daniel
Southerland, U.S., China Sign Prison Labor Pact,WASH.POST, Aug. 8, 1992, at BI.

112 12 U.S.C. § 635e (b) (1988), repealedby Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-266, § 102, 106 Stat. 95.
113 id.
14
1 id.
115 Id.
116 19 U.S.C. § 2487 (1988), repeated by Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-266, Sec. 102, 106 Stat 95.
117 id.
118 Id.
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3. The Export-Import Act of 1945119

The Export-Import Act of 1945 prohibited the Export-Import Bank from
lending or in any way participating in the extension of credits to any Communist
country except when the President made a determination that extension of credits
20
was in the national interest.
The Bank in exercise of its functions shall not guarantee, insure,
extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit (1) in connection with the purchase or lease of any product by a
Marxist-Leninist country, or agency, or national thereof...

12 1

Sec. 635 then goes on to define Marxist-Leninist and includes a list of
countries prohibited under this definition from receiving Export-Import credits. 122
The Soviet Union is on this list. 123
Sec. 409 of the Senate version of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 deleted
the Soviet Union from the ineligible list.12 4 However, this section was dropped
125
from the final version of the law.
Maintaining this particular restriction makes little sense with the lifting of
so many other financial restrictions on trade with Russia.
4. The Foreign Assistance Act of

1961126

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is a quasi-governmental
agency which insures American investments abroad. 127 The Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 prohibited OPIC from offering insurance or guarantees for projects
in any Communist country. 128 Sec. 901 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992
amended the Act by deleting the Soviet Union from the ineligible list. 129

119 12 U.S.C. § 635 (bX2)(B) (1988).
120 id.
121 id
122 Id.
123 Id.

124 S. 2532, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 409 (1992).
125 Act of Oct 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat) 3320.
126 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (f)(1) (1988).

12 7 Michael Arndt, Rush to Russia by U.S. Firms Gathers Steam, CuIc. TRiB., June 18, 1992, at Cl.
128 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (f) (1) (1988).
129

Act of OcL 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat) 3320.
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5. The Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934 (18 USC 955) 130
The Johnson Debt Default Act penalizes anyone in the U.S. who makes an
untied loan to a foreign government in default of its obligations to the U.S.
government.131
Whoever, within the United States, purchases or sells the bonds,
securities, or other obligations of any foreign government or political
subdivision thereof or any organization or association acting for or on
behalf of a foreign government or political subdivision thereof... or
makes any loan to such foreign government, political subdivision,
organization or association, except for renewal or adjustment of
existing indebtedness, while such government... is in default in the
payment of its obligations, or any part thereof, to the United States,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
132
five years, or both.
Until recently, the Johnson Debt Default Act imposed restrictions on private
financial dealings with Russia because of an estimated debt of $1.5 billion owed
to the United States.1 33 This total includes the $900 million loaned to the
Kerensky Provisional Government through the issuance of bonds to help finance
continued Russian participation in World War I. 134 It also includes an additional
$674 million from the Lend-Lease program during World War 1I. 135
The Freedom Support Act of 1992 lifted these restrictions. 36 "Section 955
of title 18, United States Code shall not apply with respect to any obligations of
the former Soviet Union, or any of the independent states of the former Soviet
1 37
Union, or any political subdivision, organization, or association thereof."
38
6. The Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act1

The Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act prohibits sales
agreements on agricultural commodities for local currencies or long-term dollar

130 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1988).
131 d
32

1 Id.

133 Clyde H. Farnsworth, Toward the Summit, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,1990, at A6.
'34 Robert Lenzer, USSR Seeking to Settle 70-Year Debt with U.S., BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 1988, at 1.
135 Farnsworth, supra note 133, at A6.
136 Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Sat.) 3320.
37

1 1.

138 41 U.S.C. § 1703 (1988).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 4

[Vol. 26: 3-4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

credits with countries unfriendly to the United States.
the law if he determines a country to be friendly. 140

39 The

President may waive

Usually, countries that were deemed unfriendly were those controlled by
the "world Communist movement."1 4 1 With the changes in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, this movement has largely collapsed. 142
Due to the improvement in U.S.-USSR relations under Gorbachev and the
even greater cooperation between the U.S. and the Russian Republic under
Yeltsin, Russia should be removed from the list of unfriendly countries.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND UNRATIFIED TREATIES

Events in the former Soviet Union have precipitated recent changes in
American policy and law with regard to the newly independent states. Further
modifications are still making their way either as a bill through Congress or as a
treaty in the Senate. Most, but not all, of the possible amendments to American
law will enhance American-Russian trade.
Treatment of the Soviet Union under the GeneralizedSystem of Preferences
S. 2798143 is the proposal to remove the Soviet Union from the list of
countries ineligible for designation as a beneficiary developing country. 44 As
discussed above, 145 the goals of this designation appear to coincide with the type
of trade relationship America desires to have with Russia. Members of Congress
should be urged to support this bill.
Treatv with the Russian Federation Concerningthe Encouragementand
Reciprocal Protectionof hnvestment' 46
During the June 1992 summit, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed
a bilateral investment treaty.147 "The treaty doesn't remove all the many obstacles

139

1d.

1401id.

141 Id. at §1703 (d).
142 The People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Cuba remain committed in varying degrees to
Communist ideology.
143 S. 2798, supra note 76.
144id.
14 5

See supra text accompanying notes 51-71.
146 Treaty for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russia, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 33, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty].
147 Stuart Auerbach, From Russia With Lower Tariffs, WASH. POST, June 19, 1992, at A33.
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to doing business in centrally controlled, non-market economies, but it addresses
48
some of the basic issues that businesses face." 1
The treaty contains several important features. First, Article IV "guarantees
the right to repatriate profits and transfer other funds out of the country by
149
converting rubles into hard currency."
Each party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to be
made freely and without delay into and out of its territory...
Companies or nationals of each Party shall be permitted to convert
such transfers into the freely convertible currency of their choice... 150
Second, Articles VI-VII provide for third party international arbitration of
disputes between U.S. investors and the Russian government. 151 Third, Article II
guarantees non-discriminatory treatment of "investment and activities associated
with the investment process. ' 152 Fourth, Article III offers protection to investors
51 3
in the event of expropriation.'
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or
indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation... except for
a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with
154
due process of law and the general principles of international law....
Finally, the investment treaty includes several other advantages to U.S.
investors: 15 5 the right to operate freely, 156 the discontinuation of screening
158
investments, 57 and access to business necessities.
Despite some potential problems, the treaty provides "substantive
protection" for investment and an "unprecedented array of remedies."' 159 This
bilateral investment treaty lays at least some of the much needed groundwork to
148 U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty Moves Forward:Progress Seen on Ruble, Profits Repatriation Issue, 3
RussIA & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Aug. 7, 1992 [hereinafter U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty Moves

Forward]. See also U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty Tackles Issue of RepatriatingRuble Profits. 3 RussIA &
COMMONWEALTH
Bus. L. REP., June 26, 1992.
14 9
U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty, supranote 146, art. W, S.TREATY Doc. No. 33 at 11.
15 0

Id.

151 U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty, supra note 146, arts. VI-VII, S.TR.EATY Doc. No.33 at 12-17.
15 2
U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty, supranote 146, art. II, S.TREATY Doc No. 33 at 6.
15 3
U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty, supranote 146, art. 11, S. TREATY Doc. No.33 at 9.
154id.
15 5
15 6

U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty, supra note 146, art II,
S.TREATY Doc No.33 at 6.
U.S.-Rssia Investment Treaty, supra note 146, art.
XVI, para. 1. S.TREATY Doc. No.33 at 11.
157U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty, supra note 146, art 1, protocol para. 3, S. TREATY Doc. No.22 at 2, 24.
158 See U.S.-Russia Investment Treaty Moves Forward, supra note 148 (discussing exemption from treaty
obligations for protection of a party's essential security interests as a potential significant loophole).
159

id.
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attract large-scale American business investment. The U.S. Senate should be
encouraged to ratify this treaty as quickly as possible.
Income Tax Convention with the Russian Federation160
President Bush and President Yeltsin also signed a tax treaty at their June
1992 summit. 16 1 This accord, once ratified, will replace the existing treaty from

1973.162 The new treaty addresses several issues. First, Article VI deals with the
issue of creditability of the Russian tax. 63 It contains provisions that permit a
U.S. investor to deduct taxes paid in Russia from its income tax in the United
States.' 64 Second, Article X covers dividends. 165 It reduces the withholding tax on
repatriated dividends, or profits, from 15% to 5% for most likely investors.' 66
67
Third, Article XIV helps narrow tax liability on personal income in Russia.
Finally, Article V permits a construction company or oil drilling company to
work inside Russia for 18 months without being subject to Russian income tax.1 68
While some difficulties 169 may persist in this area, important areas such as
the issue of "creditability of Russian taxes for U.S. tax purposes" appears to have
been resolved. 70 "The treaty is generally a favorable one for many U.S.
investors."' 7 ' "It should bring a degree of stability and predictability to the
Russian tax environment."172 As with the bilateral investment treaty, the Senate
should be urged to ratify this treaty on taxation at the earliest opportunity.

160 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russia, S. Th"EATY Doc. No. 39,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Russia Income Tax Treaty].
161 Michael Arndt, Rush to Russia bv U.S. Firms Gathers Steam, CHIC. TIUB, June 18, 1992, at Cl.
162 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 20, 1973, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1.
16 3 U.S.-Russia Income Tax Treaty, supranote 160, art. VI, S. TRtATY Doc. No: 39 at
.
1
64id.
165 U.S.-Russia Income Tax Treaty, supra note 160, art X, S. TREATY Doc. No. 39 at
.
166 d.
167 U.S.-Russia Income Tax Treaty, supranote 160, art. XIV, S. TRA-v Doc:. N. 39 at.
168 U.S.-Russia Income Tax Treaty, supra note 160, art V, S. TIEATY Doc. No. 39 at.
169 "The new treaty provides that a building site or construction, installation or assembly project, or an
installation or drilling rig or ship used for the exploration or exploitation of natural resources constitutes a
permanent establishment if it last for more than 18 months. ITihe 18-month period contrasts unfavorably with
the 36-month period in the Finland-U.S.S.R. income tax treaty and the 24-month period in both the Austrian and
U.K. treaties with the Soviet Union" John Turro, New U.S.-Russia Income Tax Treaty and Protocol Examined,
TAX NomEs INTL. Jul. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Int'l Trade Library, Tax Notes Int'l File. The dividend
article's five percent withholding rate also compares unfavorably with other Soviet conventions which provide
for zero dividend withholding rates. Jeffrey M. Trinklein, The U.S.-Russia Tax Treaty: Has the Foreign Tax
Credit Issue Been Resolved?, TAX Noms ltwrt, Oct. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Int'l Trade Library, Tax Notes
lnt'l
File.
17 0
Trinklein, supra note 169.
171 Tax Treaty Addresses Essential Issues, But Investors May Find Some Provisions Inadequate, RUSSIA &
Como wEALTH Bus. L. REP., June 26, 1992.
172id
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Restriction of Assistance for Russia Based on the Withdrawal of its Military
Forcesfrom the Baltic States
Recently in the House of Representatives, two bills were introduced which
exemplify the type of condition American lawmakers should avoid attaching to a
piece of legislation designed to give assistance to Russia. Both H.R. 5779173 and
5282174 condition financial assistance upon the withdrawal of Russian troops
from the Baltics. H.R. 5779 provides that:
the United States may not consent to an increase in its quota in the
International Monetary Fund until the President has certified to
Congress that ... Russia has developed and is implementing a plan to
withdraw from the Baltic States, within 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this subsection, its military forces (as well as any
military forces under the control of the Commonwealth of
Independent States) .... 175
...

H.R. 5282 goes even further in its demands. Matters which must be certified to
Congress before the approval of loans to Russia include:
[that] (A) significant progress has been achieved toward removal
of Russian armed forces from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; (B)
Additional Russian armed forces have not been brought into [the
Baltics] for purpose of transit to Russia or for any other purpose
without the express permission of such country; (C) Artillery exercises
or similar training operations are not being conducted by Russian
armed forces on the territory of [the Baltic States] without the express
permission of the government of such country; (D) Russian military
installations in [the Baltic States] are open to inspection by the
government of such country; (E) Russian air and naval forces are not
interfering with traffic in the air space or territorial waters of [the
Baltic States]; and (F) The government of Russia is keeping the
governments of [the Baltic States] informed regarding the number and
176
location of Russian armed forces in such country.
...

Before American trade has barely shed itself of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, some lawmakers are already looking for new ways to micromanage
a potentially explosive situation. One need not cast about a great deal to discover
why this issue is an especially sensitive one, not just in the Baltic states, but also
in Russia. First, there is an acute housing shortage that has become even more
173 H.R. 5779, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
174 H.R. 5282, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
175 H.R. 5779, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
17 6

H.R. 5282, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
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pressing as the Red Army pulls back from all over Eastern Europe. 177 It is often
the case that the government has literally nowhere to place these troops and their
t 78
families.
Second, laws in the Baltics stripping most resident ethnic Russians of even
the most basic rights have created a great deal of anger in Russia. 179 There have
been calls from hardliners for intervention to protect ethnic Russians.18°
Third, the surrounding of the Ostankino television station this summer in
Moscow was sparked in large measure by the belief of many Russians that their
government has simply become a puppet of the West, especially of the United
States.' 8 1 Attempts to dictate a matter such as how troop withdrawals should
proceed reinforces the image of the U.S. as the puppet master.
These are by no means the only domestic problems the Yeltsin government
faces, and the cumulative effect of such difficulties will only be exacerbated if
bills like H.R. 5779 and 5282 are enacted into law. President Yeltsin, thus far,
seems committed to democratic reforms, but American lawmakers should not
forget the tightrope upon which Mr. Yeltsin walks in his country. The Russian
government under President Yeltsin does not enjoy the solid foundation that the
Brezhnev government had twenty years ago. Mr. Brezhnev had no opposition
forces to whom he had to answer. Laws like the Jackson-Vanik Amendment did
not threaten Soviet stability. They do, however, have a great potential for
contributing to the destabilization of the political, economic, and social order in
the Russia of today. Such a potential put to use has negative consequences not
merely for improved trade opportunities, but for peace in general.
CONCLUSION
While this article may not have touched upon all American laws impeding
trade with Russia, it does cover the bulk of laws that have and may continue to
hamper efforts of American investors to engage in trade with Russia.
Political changes in the former Soviet Union require American lawmakers
to reevaluate our trade policy toward Russia and the other CIS republics. A
review of American legislation that has or is impeding trade with Russia
indicates that a degree of reevaluation has taken place in some areas, while in
177 Stephanie Simon, Russia Softens Stand on Baltic Troop Pullout, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1992, at A8.
178 id.
179
Id. John-Thor Dahlburg, Yeltsin Suspends Baltics Pullout,L.A. Tims, October 30, 1992, at Al. Domestic
political difficulties may force President Yeltsin to act with care as he attempts to deal with the Russian armed
forces, hard-liners, and a population that is struggling to come to terms with economic reforms. Mr. Yeltsin
deserves the benefit of the doubt when it comes to implementing the Russian army withdrawal from the Baltics.
180 Simon, supra note 177, at A8.
181 Police Oust Communists From TV Studio to End 11-Day Rally, L.A. TIMEs, June 23, 1992, at A8.
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others not at all. American restrictions on technology transfer remain the most
severe with broad statutory language and cumbersome licensing procedures.
Tariff restrictions have eased somewhat with the grant of MFN status to Russia.
However, the failure to grant Russia the designation of beneficiary developing
country and the refusal to extend GATT membership to Russia remain
impediments to the U.S.-Russia trade relationship. Many, although not all,
financial restrictions on trade with Russia have been lifted. Finally, a bilateral
investment treaty and an accord on taxation, both advantageous to U.S. investors,
await Senate ratification.
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